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Trade Policy Briefs are short summaries of studies funded by the CATPRN.  As such, the briefs omit 
many of the details and most of the references contained in the longer reports.  This brief is based on 
CATPRN Commissioned Paper CP 2008-01.  This paper grew out of a workshop where a group of 
agricultural trade experts were invited to discuss the consequences of a failed Doha Round for Canadian 
agriculture. Although every member of the group contributed ideas that are reflected in this report, Mike 
Gifford, Alex McCalla and Karl Meilke assumed the responsibility for drafting the paper. The other 
participants in the workshop were: Karen Huff, University of Guelph; William Kerr, University of 
Saskatchewan; Kurt Klein, University of Lethbridge; James Rude, University of Alberta; and Robert Wolfe, 
Queens University. Funding for this project was provided by the Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy 
Research Network (CATPRN).  The CATPRN is funded by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada but the 
views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the funding agency. 2 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Since the Doha Round was launched the agricultural negotiations have staggered from 
crisis-to-crisis but recently the elements of a potential deal have emerged.  While a few 
difficult issues remain to be resolved, it appears a deal could be finalized rather quickly 
if there was sufficient political will to do so.
i  Unfortunately, it is not clear that this political 
will exists.
ii   
Canada has a huge stake in the negotiations with about 40 percent of our goods and 
services being sold to foreign buyers.  This is equally true in agriculture where our 
products compete for sales in markets around the globe.  Outside of agriculture the US 
is our dominant trading partner, accounting for over 80 percent of total merchandise 
exports, compared to less than 60 percent for agrifood exports.  As a result, many non-
agricultural sectors view NAFTA as our key trade agreement, not the WTO.  Given 
agriculture’s dependence on multilateral market access this brief is focused on two key 
issues: 1) what are the implications of a failure of the Doha Round for Canadian 
agriculture; and 2) what are Canada’s options if the Doha Round does fail.
iii  
2.0  CONSEQUENCES OF A DOHA ROUND FAILURE FOR AGRICULTURE  
Some will argue that a failure of the Doha Round would be of little consequence to 
Canadian agriculture  We feel this viewpoint is incorrect, and the failure to conclude the 
Doha Round would represent a lost opportunity for Canadian agriculture.  Current, high 
grain prices will not last forever and the opportunity to lock-in much needed agricultural 
trade reforms should be a high priority of the Canadian government and the agrifood 
sector. Some major trends that would follow from a Doha Round failure include the 
following. 
First, the increasing proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs).  A 
substantial Doha Round result on tariffs would reduce the preference margins of 
existing or new PTAs and moderate to some extent the pressure for regional accords.
iv 
A Doha Round failure leaves Canada at a competitive disadvantage, as other 
agricultural exporters seek to improve market access opportunities through  bilateral or 
plurilateral free trade agreements.  Agriculture is particularly vulnerable to being put at a 
competitive disadvantage in a world of proliferating PTAs. This is because non-NAFTA 
markets account for a much larger share of Canada’s total exports for agrifood than for 
other sectors.  Also, the Canadian market may not be attractive enough to capture the 
interests of the larger, prospective PTA partners (e.g., India and China).  
Second, the increasing use of litigation.  If the Doha Round fails, countries may seek 
to get through litigation what they could not get through negotiation.
 v  Increased WTO 
litigation runs the risk that the dispute settlement system begins to buckle as 
governments become tired of losing panel cases and become more willing to ignore 
negative panel findings.  It is asking too much to expect the dispute settlement system 
to indefinitely shoulder the burden of failed negotiations. Moreover, a smaller country 
that retaliates under WTO authority inevitably hurts either its industries that depend on 
imported inputs or its consumers 3 
 
There would also be no new disciplines on trade remedies, particularly anti-dumping 
duties, which are being increasingly used by importers to protect domestic markets. 
Third, the increasing abuse of sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) and 
technical barriers to trade.  A failure of the Doha Round might encourage and 
reinforce protectionist pressures, particularly in the area of technical regulations. The 
SPS Agreement provides a shield against pressures to use SPS measures for 
protectionist rather than legitimate science-based reasons. However, a Doha Round 
failure that undermines the credibility of the WTO increases the risk that the “shield” will 
be unable to deflect protectionist pressures. 
Fourth, less pressure to reform domestic agricultural policies.  While some say 
that reform of the EU agriculture policy is irreversible, others argue that a failure of the 
Doha Round would hold back further reforms.  Certainly, if there are no commitments to 
phase out export subsidies, the EU will be under pressure to use them in depressed 
market conditions (witness the recent reintroduction of EU export subsidies on pork).  
However, the EU may be less likely to backslide than the countries of North America 
which have not undertaken anywhere near the same degree of domestic policy reform. 
The United States in writing its 2008 Farm Bill has taken little notice of any new WTO 
requirements on domestic support, except to say it will bring its programs into 
compliance if and when it is required.  The present US ceiling on some forms of trade 
distorting support would remain unchanged and other forms would remain undisciplined 
under a Doha Round failure, the US would continue to have the right to subsidise 
exports and the trade distorting elements of export credit subsides, export credit 
guarantees and food aid would not be eliminated.   
Canada's ability to unilaterally reform domestic agricultural policies may be limited by 
the history of provinces operating their own price and income support policies.  A Doha 
Round failure would result in less external pressures to adapt Canada's agricultural 
policies so they are sustainable in a more open and less distorted trading environment - 
reforms that will eventually be required and whose costs will only increase over time. 
In addition, Canadian policy-makers face political pressure to compensate producers for 
distortions caused by other countries’ policies. In recent years, the focus has been on 
support in the US, which is on average lower than in Canada but concentrated in fewer 
sectors, particularly grains and oilseeds. The absence of a Doha Round result would 
encourage Canadian grain and oilseed producers to continue to press for financial 
"compensation" for higher US support programs (already obtained in some provinces).  
Fifth, loss of market access opportunities.  Failure of the Doha Round will result in 
slower growth in import demand, particularly in export-led developing countries – the 
best future markets for Canadian agrifood producers. The proposed considerable 
reductions in their bound agricultural tariffs would be lost. Failure also implies no 
reductions in the gap between applied and bound tariffs, allowing unilateral increases in 4 
 
applied tariffs.
vi  The most import sensitive products would see no doubling or tripling of 
tariff rate quota volumes entering at lower tariffs, mainly in developed country import 
markets.
vii The positive impacts from the trade facilitation negotiations, which would 
reduce the red tape and transaction costs associated with imports, would also be lost.    
Canada's export performance in the US has been strong and diversified - a result of the 
duty free access for almost all our exports. The dramatic increase in Canada's exports 
of processed potatoes to the US shows how improved access can result in more 
investment and production of a value-added product. Canada's performance in offshore 
markets is relatively weak because of the continued existence of high tariffs and tariff 
escalation. It is not by luck that Canada's best non-NAFTA export performance is in 
China, which significantly reduced its agricultural tariffs when acceding to the WTO. 
3.0  OPTIONS FOR CANADA 
If the Doha Round negotiations break down completely or are effectively placed in the 
deep freeze for several years, what trade policy options are available to Canada? 
3.1   Reliance on the Domestic Market, NAFTA and a Few Other PTAs 
This option reflects the trade policy status quo plus the completion of planned 
preferential agreements with Korea, CARICOM, and several Latin American countries. It 
is a cautious, reactive trade policy that responds to the initiatives of others. This status 
quo scenario might please the supply managed industries but it will certainly not please 
the rest of the Canadian agrifood sector, since such a scenario would: 1) hamper the 
sector’s offshore growth opportunities; 2) place it at a competitive disadvantage vis à vis 
competitors who are pursuing more aggressive PTA policies; and 3) generally retard the 
growth and competitiveness of any export oriented sector. The scenario would continue 
to allow the international competitiveness of the supply managed sectors to deteriorate. 
3.2  Concentrate on Deepening and Broadening the NAFTA 
While this is a longstanding goal of much of the Canadian business community, the 
reality is there is little support in the US for expanding and deepening NAFTA. 
Nevertheless, the US might be interested in a very narrow negotiation which is limited, 
inter alia, to completing the agricultural chapter of NAFTA which allows a limited number 
of exceptions to duty free trade. There would be massive opposition from the supply 
managed sectors to a phase out of over-quota tariffs on NAFTA trade, which would 
imply a phase out of supply management and a complete loss of production quota 
values. While NAFTA free trade would permit Canada to pursue more aggressive trade 
liberalization internationally, the reality is that the political debate would center on this 
being the end of supply management. The politics of this scenario are daunting, given 
the concentration of dairy and poultry production in Quebec and Ontario and its effective 
political influence throughout Canada. 5 
 
A more limited but more plausible scenario is for Canada to concentrate on limiting any 
"thickening" of the border while intensifying the development of more harmonized 
technical regulations within NAFTA. 
3.3  Pursue a More Aggressive Preferential Trade Agreement Agenda 
Bilateral and regional free trade agreements offer the possibility of deeper and faster 
improvements in market access than multilateral negotiations. Unfortunately, most free 
trade agreements treat agriculture as a sector requiring exceptions from the duty free 
norm. Still, a Doha Round failure would reinforce existing pressures in a number of 
countries to pursue preferential arrangements. It would be hard for a Canadian 
government to ignore pleas to level the playing field in the face of existing or new 
preferential agreements by Canada's export competitors in third markets. 
A more aggressive preferential trade agreement agenda could involve actively pursuing 
PTAs with prospective major markets individually (China and India especially) or as part 
of a larger plurilateral initiative.  What Canada could bring to the table would include 
security of supply of a number of resources, but it would also likely involve negotiations 
aimed at minimizing restrictions on foreign investment in Canada's resource sectors. 
3.4  Press for a Re-engagement of the WTO Negotiations 
If the Doha Round negotiations fail to conclude in 2008, it is unlikely that they will 
conclude before 2011.  There is no guarantee that negotiators can "freeze" what is on 
the table in early 2008 and then simply pick-up where they left off when the negotiations 
resume some years later. Therefore if it appears that the negotiations will not conclude 
in 2008, the "friends" of the WTO will need to press for a "managed" disengagement 
rather than an acrimonious breakdown. This would involve Canada working with others 
to ensure that what is on the table in 2008 will not be reopened and that efforts are 
made to conclude the Round soon. If instead the Doha Round collapses with no further 
meetings scheduled, Canada should begin the analytical and bridge-building work that 
will be needed to launch a new Round in 2011. A meltdown of the multilateral trading 
system is something Canada should exert every effort to avoid.  
If Canada wants to be more influential in resuscitating and sustaining multilateral 
negotiations, it needs to more effectively reconcile its agricultural trade liberalization 
goals with the political sensitivities of supply management. In the Uruguay and Doha 
Rounds, Canada's defensive preoccupations with supply management have limited its 
ability to influence the negotiations. While regarded as a help to the Doha Round 
negotiations through the ideas it brings to the table in other negotiating areas in 
agriculture, Canada is regarded as part of the problem when it comes to market access.  
If Canada wants to retain supply management as a domestic agricultural policy tool, it 
must articulate how it intends to do this in light of the global trend to reduce trade 
barriers and to move away from price support policies.  The EU experience in reforming 6 
 
its agriculture policy provides some guidance on how to approach politically sensitive 
agricultural policy adjustments. The approach of the EU Commission of setting out the 
challenges and identifying possible ways to meet these challenges in a white paper, 
before entering into detailed consultations with stakeholders,has enabled the agriculture 
policy to evolve so that it is much more compatible with an open trading system.  
The focus of the supply management/trade policy conundrum also needs to be shifted 
away from the two extremes of maintaining the status quo or eliminating supply 
management – to a more centrist, pragmatic approach which recognizes the political 
realities of Canadian public policy. An informed debate arising from a realistic white 
paper would allow for the development of a viable game plan for the future of supply 
management, while permitting Canada to pursue an aggressive trade policy aimed at 
concluding either a new or resumed Doha Round. 
4.0 CONCLUSIONS 
Canadian agricultural policy-makers need to recognize that suspension or failure of the 
Doha Round negotiations in 2008 would not mean the end of multilateral negotiations, 
and a likely scenario is the resumption of the negotiations or the start of a new Round 
within the next several years. Preferential trade agreements are expected to continue to 
proliferate but are not a substitute for multilateral agricultural trade reform, especially for 
smaller countries like Canada.  
None of the four policy options explored are mutually exclusive. Elements of each of the 
four can be pursued concurrently.  Agricultural trade reform is a means to an end, not 
an end in itself. For Canada, the reason why a rules-based, more open and less 
distorted multilateral trading system should continue to be an overriding goal is that it 
provides the best opportunity for ensuring a more sustainable, more competitive 
agricultural economy for all regions of Canada. Pursuit of new preferential trade 
agreements is a defensive response to the initiatives of others and for this reason it will 
be pursued. However, for an agricultural trading country such as Canada, multilateral 
trade reform should be paramount and Canada should position itself so it can more 
effectively help influence and shape the international trading system. The alternative is 
to be swept along by the current of globalization, whether we like it or not. 
Clearly there are limits to what a medium-sized trading country can accomplish in 
influencing the future shape of the agricultural trading system. Moreover, as increasing 
numbers of developing countries are able to play active roles in the WTO, the number of 
influential players has increased. Nevertheless, Canada has shown in the past that it 
can effectively punch above its weight and has the potential to continue to play an 
influential role in the WTO. The challenge will be to position itself so that it can fully 
exploit this potential – a task which will require a comprehensive and credible 
negotiating position on agriculture. The alternative is to continue to muddle through and 
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i Proposals have also been tabled by the Chair’s of the other key negotiating groups on non-agricultural 
market access, services and rules. These proposals are not as fully developed as the one on agriculture, 
partly because members are waiting to gauge the degree of ambition in agriculture.  An “ambitious” 
agricultural deal would make it easier to close the gaps in other areas of the negotiations where major 
differences still exist.   
ii Gifford and McCalla (2008a) outline the reasons why an agreement has been so difficult to reach. 
iii An outcome more likely than failure is a long postponement with the negotiations resuming after the US 
presidential elections are over.  This outcome is discussed in more detail in Gifford, McCalla and Meilke 
but it would likely postpone any potential deal until at least 2011.   
iv When countries are members of a free trade agreement products generally flow between member 
countries at zero tariffs, providing them with a competitive advantage over counties outside the 
agreement who still face positive tariffs, i.e., member countries enjoy a preference margin. Since 
multilateral tariff negotiations lower the tariffs faced by all counties they lower the preference margin of 
countries in the free trade area.    
v One of the major accomplishments of the Uruguay Round was the establishment of an improved 
dispute settlement system. Under the GATT, panels were prevented from being established or the results 
were blocked from being adopted because of the requirement for consensus on every decision. Under the 
WTO, countries have a right to a panel and the defending country cannot block the adoption of a dispute 
settlement finding. 
vi Reductions in bound tariffs are negotiated in the WTO, and if a country wants to raise its bound tariffs it 
must provide its trading partners compensation.  However, the tariff actually applied in developing 
countries is often well below its bound rate.  These applied rates can be increased up to the bound rate 
on the whims of the importer and with no compensation provided to exporters. 
vii The expected impacts of a Doha agreement on Canada’s import sensitive products and supply 
management are discussed in Gifford and McCalla (2008b). 